Strong light illumination on gain-switched semiconductor lasers helps
  the eavesdropper in practical quantum key distribution systems by Fei, Yang-Yang et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
3.
05
61
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
15
 M
ar 
20
18
Strong light illumination on gain-switched
semiconductor lasers helps the eavesdropper in
practical quantum key distribution systems
Yang-yang Fei1,*, Xiang-dong Meng1, Ming Gao1, Yi Yang1, Hong Wang1, and Zhi Ma1,2
1State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing, Zhengzhou, Henan, 450001,
China
2CAS Center for Excellence and Synergetic Innovation Center in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, 230026, China
*fei yy@foxmail.com
ABSTRACT
The temperature of the semiconductor diode increases under strong light illuminationwhether thermoelectric cooler is installed
or not, which changes the output wavelength of the laser (Lee M. S. et al., 2017). However, other characteristics also vary
as temperature increases. These variations may help the eavesdropper in practical quantum key distribution systems. We
study the effects of temperature increase on gain-switched semiconductor lasers by simulating temperature dependent rate
equations. The results show that temperature increase may cause large intensity fluctuation, decrease the output intensity
and lead the signal state and decoy state distinguishable. We also propose a modified photon number splitting attack by
exploiting the effects of temperature increase. Countermeasures are also proposed.
keywords: quantum key distribution, gain-switched semiconductor laser, rate equation, strong light illumination.
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1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide unconditional security to distribute key between two remote parts with perfect
devices1–3. However, practical devices always deviate from the models in security proofs. These deviations reduce the secure
key and many attacks on imperfect devices have been proposed to steal information about the final key4–21. Thus, study on
the imperfections of practical devices is extremely important to the security of QKD systems.
The sources of practical QKD systems also suffer from some imperfections. Attenuated laser pulses are always used as
the ”single photon source” in practical QKD systems due to technique limitation. However, the attenuated pulses may contain
more than one photons, which can be attacked by photon number splitting (PNS) attack4. To against PNS attack on weak
coherent source, decoy state method is proposed22–24. In the ”weak + vacuum” decoy state method25, a sender (Alice) needs
to transmit pluses of three intensities (signal state, decoy state and vacuum state) to a receiver (Bob). Usually, the intensity of
signal state is higher than that of the decoy state.
Gain-switched semiconductor laser is widely used in practical QKD systems as the transmitter, because it simplifies the
construction of the source and sends phase randomized pulses26. The phase randomness of the pulses is assumed in most
security proofs. A gain-switched semiconductor laser is driven from the initial carrier density, which is below the threshold,
by a strong AC injection current pulse with the level of JAC for each photon pulse generation in QKD systems. The initial
carrier density is determined by a DC bias current, JDC. Short pulses are generated by injection of short current pulses into a
semiconductor laser. The shape of the output photon pulses are directly defined by JAC and JDC. Actually, the carrier density
and photon density vary fast and acutely in the gain-switched operation. A rate equation description is used to efficiently
and accurately simulate the performance of gain-switched semiconductor lasers with proper choice of model parameters. The
output performance of a semiconductor laser is sensitive to temperature variation27. So most semiconductor lasers work with
thermoelectric coolers to keep the temperature of semiconductor diode stable.
In Ref. [28], Lee et al. experimentally show that the temperatures of semiconductor diodes can be increased by strong
light illumination, even when the lasers are installed with thermoelectric coolers. Due to the limit power of the thermoelectric
cooler, the temperature of the diode increases as long as the illumination is strong enough. Temperature increase leads to output
wavelength variation which makes pulses from different lasers distinguishable28. However, the wavelength variation do not
impact the security of QKD systems with only one laser, such as phase encoding systems. Besides, other characteristics of
the semiconductor lasers also change with temperature27,29. The variations of other characteristics also deviate the behavior
of semiconductor lasers from ideal models in security proofs. And the eavesdropper may exploit these variations to steal
information about the final key. So it is urgently needed to study the effects of temperature increase on important characteristics
of gain-switched semiconductor lasers.
In the following, we mainly focus on the effects of temperature increase on gain-switched semiconductor diodes in QKD
systems. This article is constructed as follows: we briefly introduce the temperature dependent single mode rate equation of
semiconductor lasers and the model parameters for a gain-switched semiconductor laser used in this paper in Sec. II. Then
numerical simulation of the efficient and accurate single mode temperature dependent rate equation is performed in Sec. III.
The effects of temperature increase on three characteristics are studied in detail, which include the recovery time of carrier
density, the intensity of output pulses and the time interval between signal state and decoy state pulses. In Sec. IV, we propose
a modified PNS attack strategy which exploits the effects of temperature increase. We also give out the hacking strategy using
side channels in time dimension. Finally, we conclude the paper and discuss countermeasures in Sec. V.
2 Temperature dependent single mode rate equation of semiconductor laser
Temperature variations effect the output characteristics of semiconductor lasers significantly. Recent research shows the
eavesdropper can elevate the working temperature of a semiconductor laser diode by strong light illumination even when
thermoelectric cooler is installed. So the effects of temperature increase on the output performance of semiconductor lasers
should be taken into consideration in practical QKD systems.
The dynamics of semiconductor laser at different temperatures can be described efficiently and accurately with the follow-
ing single mode rate equations covering temperature29–31
dN(t)
dt
=
J(t)
qd
−
N(t)
τn(T )
− g0(T )[N(t)−N0(T )]S(t), (1)
dS(t)
dt
= Γg0(T )[N(t)−N0(T )]S(t)−
S(t)
τp
+
Γβ N(t)
τn(T )
, (2)
where t represents time, T is temperature, q is electrical charge,N(t) is the time-variation carrier density and S(t) represents the
time-variation photon density. J(t) is the overall injection current and J(t) = JAC(t)+ JDC. Others are material parameters of
semiconductor lasers, which are explained in detail in Table. 1. Note that N0(T ), τn(T ) and g0(T ) are three main temperature
related parameters and others can be treated as constants, which are temperature independent.
Experiment observations give the following relationship between the threshold current density and the the temperature
Jth(T ) = Jcexp(T/T0)
32, where T0 is the characteristic temperature of the diode and Jc is the current density constant. There-
fore we have
Jth(T +∆T) = Jcexp(
T +∆T
T0
) = Jth(T )exp(
∆T
T0
). (3)
By solving Eqs. (1) and (2), the threshold current density of the diode can also be approximately given out by
Jth(T )≈
qd
τn(T )
Nth(T ) =
qd
τn(T )
[−
1
g0(T )Γτp
+N0(T )], (4)
where Nth(T ) is the threshold value of carrier density. Here we use the same models as the ones in Ref. [29] to describe g0(T )
and N0(T ), as shown in Eqs. (5) and (6). The models fit the experiment results very well.
g0(T ) = g0cexp(
−T
T0a
), (5)
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N0(T ) = N0cexp(
T
T0a
), (6)
where g0c is the differential gain coefficient constant, N0c is the transparent carrier density constant and T0a is the characteristic
temperature of the active region. So we have g0(T +∆T ) = g0(T )exp(−∆T/T0a), N0(T +∆T) = N0(T )exp(∆T/T0a) and
Jth(T +∆T)≈
qd
τn(T +∆T)
[
1
g0(T +∆T )Γτp
+N0(T +∆T )] =
τn(T )
τn(T +∆T )
Jth(T )exp(
∆T
T0a
). (7)
By combining Eqs. (3) and (7), we can get
τn(T +∆T) = τn(T )
exp( ∆T
T0a
)
exp(∆T
T0
)
. (8)
Until now, all the three temperature dependent parameters can be calculated at different temperatures. And we can perform
numeral simulation of the rate equations (Eqs. (1) and (2)) at different temperatures.
Number Parameter symbol Description Value Units
1 g0(T ) temperature dependent differential gain coefficient 2× 10
−6 (at 25oC)31 cm3 · s−1
2 N0(T ) temperature dependent transparent carrier density 10
18 (at 25oC)31 cm−3
3 τn(T ) temperature dependent carrier lifetime 1.2 (at 25
oC)31 ns
4 τp photon lifetime 5.0
31 ps
5 β fraction of spontaneous emission coupled into lasing mode 0.001 -
6 d thickness of active region 0.1 µm
7 Γ mode confinement factor 0.5 -
8 JAC AC current density injected into active region 2.4× 10
4 A · cm−2
9 JDC DC current density injected into active region 4.8× 10
2 A · cm−2
10 T0 characteristic temperature of the long wavelength diode 80 K
10 T0a characteristic temperature of the active region 100
29 K
Table 1. Values of model parameters used in our numeral simulation of the rate equation. A dash (-) in the ”Units” column
means that the value is dimensionless.
3 The effects of temperature increase on several characteristics of semiconductor lasers
in decoy state QKD systems
As we stated before, Eve can increase the temperature of the semiconductor lasers by strong light illumination28. And the
temperature increase will impact the output performance of semiconductor lasers. In QKD systems, any deviations from ideal
models in security proofs will reduce the amount of final key. Thus, it is very important to study the effects of temperature
increase on several characteristics of semiconductor lasers. Here by performing numerical simulation with the temperature
dependent single mode rate equations (Eqs. (1) and (2)), we mainly study the effects of temperature increase on three char-
acteristics which include the recovery time of the carrier density, the intensity of output pulses and the time interval between
signal state and decoy state pulses.
3.1 Recovery time of carriers density
First, we briefly describe the variety of carrier density via time in the gain-switched mode. In the beginning, the carrier
density N(t) increases when large current is injected. Then when N(t) reaches the temperature dependent transparent carrier
density N0(T ), the stimulated radiation process starts. Output laser is generated when N(t) reaches the temperature dependent
threshold carrier density Nth(T ). Then N(t) falls quickly because of the disappearance of injected current and large amount
consumptions of stimulated radiation. When N(t) falls under N0(T ), Eq. (1) can be simplified to dN(t)/dt = N(t)/τn(T ),
which means N(t) follows the exponential decay after that.
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Normally, N(t) should return to temperature dependent initial carrier density NDC(T ) before the next injection current
comes. Otherwise, the initial carrier density of the next pulse is higher than that of the first one, which results a stronger photon
pulse. The time needed for N(t) to decay from N0(T ) to NDC(T ) is ted = τn(T )ln(N0(T )/NDC(T )). Note that NDC(T ) =
JDCτn(T )/(qd)
33 and NDC(T ) decreases as the temperature increases. We call the time needed for N(t) to return back to
NDC(T ) the recovery time, denoted as tre. The maximal repetition rate of the output photon pulses is 1/tre in practical QKD
systems. ted contributes most of tre. The temperature increase leads to the elevation of N0(T ) and the decrease of NDC(T ),
which prolongs ted as well as tre. To reduce the recovery time of carrier density, JDC should be set close to Jth(T )
31,34. However,
the spontaneous emission under high JDC causes high dark counts, which definitely increases the quantum bit error rate and
decreases the secure key rate34. So the value of JDC should be carefully considered in practical QKD systems. Here we set
JDC = 4.8× 10
2A · cm−2 as shown in Table. 1. The corresponding NDC(25
◦C)=0.3Nth(25
◦C).
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Figure 1. Numerical simulation of the recovery time of carrier density at different temperatures. The solid, dash dotted and
dash line represents the carrier density of semiconductor laser at 15◦C, 35◦C and 45◦C respectively. Elliptic region is
amplified in the inset figure. We can see that NDC(T ) decreases as the temperature increases. N(t) reaches Nth(T ) earlier for
lower temperature, which leads the maximal value of N(t) smaller for lower temperature. N(t) follows the exponential decay
after N0(T ) and N0(15
◦C) <N0(35
◦C) <N0(45
◦C). Therefore, the lower the temperature seems to be the lower the carrier
density after about 0.1ns.
To simulate the variation of N(t), we excite the semiconductor diode with a single current pulse. The initial carrier density
is set to NDC(T ) for different temperatures. The single injection current pulse is rectangular shape and it starts at 0ps and
disappears at 100ps. The value of the single injection current pulse is JAC. Other parameters can be found in Table. 1.
Fig. 1 shows the numerical simulation results of tre of carrier density at different temperatures. It is obvious that tre
extends as the temperature increases. Specifically, tre = 1.24ns at 15
◦C and tre = 1.60ns at 45
◦C in our simulation, which
leads the maximal repetition rate decreases from 806.5MHz to 625.0MHz. In this case, the initial carrier density at 15◦C is
NDC(15
◦C) = 3.69× 1023m−3 and the carrier density at 45◦C is NDC(45
◦C) = 3.42× 1023m−3.
If the semiconductor laser simulated above works at a frequency of 800MHz and the thermoelectric cooler stabilizes the
temperature at 15◦C. N(t) can always returns to NDC(15
◦C) before next current pulse comes. However, as we stated before,
Eve is able to increase the temperature of the semiconductor diode to T ′ by strong light illumination. As the temperature
increases, tre prolongs and N(t) may not return to NDC(T
′) before the next injection current applied anymore, which makes
the initial carrier density of the second pulse higher than that of the first pulse. So the second photon pulse is stronger than the
first one and large photon intensity fluctuation is induced31,34.
Fig. 2(a) (Fig. 2(b)) shows the numerical simulation results of the time-variation carrier density and photon density of
the laser working at 800MHz when the temperature is 15◦C (45◦C). The duration of the injected current, Tduration, is also
100ps. The output light intensity is always assumed to be stable in QKD security proofs. However, the numerical simulation
results above show that the temperature increase, which is able to be achieved by Eve using strong light illumination or
microwave radiation, may strongly effect the output light intensity stability of the semiconductor lasers, especially the output
light intensity stability of the lasers which work at the frequency near the maximal repetition rate. More specifically, if a laser
works at a frequency of f and 625MHz< f ≤ 806.5MHz, the laser works well at 15◦C and the effect like the one in Fig. 2(b)
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appears when temperature increases to 45◦C. However, when f<625MHz which means the working frequency of the laser
at 45◦C is still lower than the maximal repetition rate of 45◦C (625MHz), the effect like the one in Fig. 2(b) will no longer
appears.
(a) (b)
Figure 2. Simulation results of Eqs. (1) and (2) at different temperatures. The solid (dash) line shows how photon (carrier)
density changes with time. The dotted line represents the value of NDC(T ). (a)Simulation results at 15
◦C. (b)Simulation
results at 45◦C.
3.2 Intensity of output pulses
The photon density reaches the maximum when N(t) falls back to Nth(T ). The number of photons created by stimulated
radiation is proportional to the number of carriers consumed in the active region. The initial carrier density is NDC(T ). The
carrier density injected in one cycle is JACTduration/(qd). So the maximal photon density is given by
Smax ∝ [
JACTduration
qd
−Nth(T )+NDC(T )]. (9)
Note that Nth(T ) = N0(T )+ 1/[g0(T )Γτp] and Nth(T ) increases when the temperature increases. NDC(T ) decreases as the
temperature increases. Other parameters in Eq. (9) can be treated as constant. So Smax decreases as the temperature increases.
Similarly, the stimulated radiation stops when N(t) drops back to N0(T ). Therefore, the intensity of the output photon
pulse is
Pmax ∝ [
JACTduration
qd
−N0(T )+NDC(T )]. (10)
So the output intensity also drops as the temperature increase.
Fig. 3 gives out the numerical simulation results of photon density at different temperatures. By the method of simulating
the rate equations (Eqs. (1) and (2)), we can also find the fact that temperature increase leads to the decrease of Smax (see
Table. 2 for detail). Similar results are founded in experiment in Ref. [35].
The output light intensity is supposed to be constant in most QKD security proofs. However, our analysis and numerical
simulation results show that the temperature increase in the laser decreases the output light intensity of semiconductor lasers.
So Eve can break the security assumption by strong light illumination (or other tricks to heat the diode) to increase the
temperature of the diode. Besides, we can also find that the time of the peak of the output photon pulse prolongs as temperature
increases, which also impacts the security of practical QKD with multiple semiconductor lasers34.
3.3 Time interval between signal state and decoy state pulses
In QKD systems with ”weak + vacuum” decoy state method25, the signal state pulses and decoy state pulses can be produced
by different lasers or by the same laser. The decoy state pulses are excited by a lower AC injection current. In our simulation,
we suppose the value of AC injection current of decoy state pulses is 2.0× 104A · cm−2 and the duration is also 100ps.
5/12
Time (ns)
0.1 0.15
P
h
o
to
n
 d
en
si
ty
 (
1
0
2
3
m
-3
)
0
0.5
1
1.5
15
o
C
25
o
C
35
o
C
45
o
C
Figure 3. Numerical simulation results of photon density at different temperatures. The dash, solid, dash dotted and dotted
line represents the photon density of semiconductor laser at 15◦C, 25◦C, 35◦C and 45◦C respectively.
Two time dependent parameters of the semiconductor lasers should be taken into consideration in QKD systems, which
includes the turn on time delay and the peak time delay. The turn on time delay is the interval from the AC injection current
applied to the lasing power going out from the laser diode. Note that the laser turns on when N(t) arises to Nth(T ). And the
interval from the time when AC injection current applied to the time when S(t) reaching maximum value is called the peak
time delay. The turn on time delay of signal (decoy) state is denoted as ton(signal(decoy) state). And the peak time delay of
signal (decoy) is represented by tpeak(signal(decoy) state).
Temperature 15oC 20oC 25oC 30oC 35oC 40oC 45oC
Nth(T )(10
24m−3) 1.13 1.16 1.20 1.24 1.29 1.33 1.39
NDC(T )(10
23m−3) 3.69 3.65 3.60 3.56 3.51 3.47 3.42
Smax of signal state (10
23m−3) 1.42 1.40 1.37 1.31 1.17 1.01 0.83
Smax of decoy state (10
22m−3) 8.82 7.54 6.33 4.79 3.26 2.07 0.57
ton(signal state) (ps) 52.3 56.4 58.5 62.1 65.7 69.0 72.9
tpeak(signal state) (ps) 95.9 97.9 100 102 105 108 111
ton(decoy state) (ps) 63.6 67.8 71.3 74.0 80.1 83.8 90.1
tpeak(decoy state) (ps) 111 113 118 122 129 137 156
Table 2. Simulation results of Smax, ton and tpeak of signal state and decoy state at different temperatures. Nth(T ) is also
given out.
Simulation results of Smax, ton, tpeak, NDC(T ) and Nth(T ) at different temperatures are given out in Table. 2. As we can see,
ton(signal state) (tpeak(signal state)) is always earlier than ton(decoy state) (tpeak(decoy state)). If the time of the injection
current applied in the decoy state pulses is the same with that in the signals state pulses, i.e., the signal state pulses and the
decoy state pulses are driven by the same clock without adjustment of individual delay, the signal state pulses are always
transmitted earlier than the decoy state pulses. This phenomenon is observed in experiment in Ref. [36]. So legitimate users
should postpone the time to apply the injection current in signal state pulses, which aligns the peaks of decoy state pulses and
signal state pulses in time frame. However, we find that the peaks of the signal state pulses and decoy state pulses are not
aligned in time frame anymore when the temperature of the laser diode increases.
Let ∆ton = ton(decoy state)− ton(signal state) and ∆tpeak = tpeak(decoy state)− tpeak(signal state). Fig. 4 shows ∆ton and
∆tpeak at different temperatures in our simulation. As we can see, ∆ton varies little. However, ∆tpeak rises obviously as the
temperature increases. Specifically, ∆tpeak increases from 15.1ps at 15
◦C to 45.0ps at 45◦C. If the peak of signal state pulses
and the peak of decoy state pulses are accurately adjusted to coincide at 15◦C, they will mismatch with a time interval of
29.9ps which is comparable with the light pulse width used in practical QKD systems.
The simulation results show that temperature increase in the diode of a semiconductor laser leads to a distinct raise of
∆tpeak. Eve is able to take advantage of this temperature dependent imperfections to enlarge time dependent side channels.
That is the signal state can be shifted from the decoy state by increasing the temperature. And the well-aligned signal state
and decoy state pulses become distinguishable in time frame as temperature rises, which break the basic assumption of decoy
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state method. Then Eve can launch an improved PNS attack to steal the final key, as explained in Ref. [36]. Moreover, the
ratio of signal state intensity and decoy state intensity also rises quickly from 1.61 at 15◦C to 14.56 at 45◦C.
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Figure 4. Simulation results of ∆ton and ∆tpeak at different temperatures. The circle line represents the the time interval
between ton of signal state and decoy state. The square line shows the time interval between tpeak of signal state and decoy
state.
4 Quantum hacking strategies
We have demonstrated that three main characteristics vary with temperature increase. These variations may effect the security
of practical QKD systems. In this section, we will discuss quantum hacking strategies which exploit the variations of three
main characteristics.
4.1 Hacking with side channels in time dimension
Normally, the carrier density decreases down to the steady level of NDC after a period of time much longer than the carrier
life. If the next AC injection occurs after the carrier density becomes back to NDC, output pulse will be identical with the
previous one. However, the recovery time of carrier density increases with temperature. As shown in Fig. 2(b), temperature
increase may lead the initial carrier density of the pulse higher than that of the previous one when the semiconductor lasers
are operated near the maximal repetition rate. So the intensity of the output pulse is relatively stronger than the previous one.
And it takes shorter time for carrier density to reach Nth(T ) than that in the previous pulse, which leads the pulse emits earlier
than the previous one. Such correlation between consecutive pulses destroys randomness whether Alice generates quantum
states with true randomness or not. So Eve may take advantage of the side channels in time dimension to steal information34.
For example, in a polarization based QKD system, Eve detects that one pulse emits earlier in time dimension, she knows that
the same laser also fires in the previous cycle and the consecutive pulses contain the same bit information.
Temperature increase also decreases the output pulse intensity and prolongs the output timing of the photon pulse, which
can also be exploited by Eve. For example, Eve sends strong H-polarized light to the source of a passive-basis-choice polar-
ization based QKD system. Therefore, the temperatures of four lasers have the following relationship, TH >T+ = T− >TV ,
where TH (T+, T−, TV ) represents the temperature of laser H (+, -, V). So the output timing of four lasers are shifted, which
also enlarges side channels in time dimension.
4.2 Modified PNS attack on decoy state QKD systems
As stated before, the signal state and decoy state may become distinguishable when the temperature increases. Besides, the
intensity of output pulse decreases and the ratio of signal state intensity to decoy state intensity also rises as temperature
increases. By combining these phenomena, we propose a modified PNS attack on decoy state QKD systems. We grant Eve
with quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement ability.
The modified PNS attack strategy is shown in Fig. 5. First, Eve increases the temperature of semiconductor laser by
some methods, such as strong light illumination. Then, because the signal state may partially overlap the decoy state, Eve can
determine the state of a photon pulse (signal state or decoy state) with a probability denoted as pdis by exploiting side channels
in time dimension, which can be achieved by using QND measurement ability and operating the optical switch precisely. For
the certain decoy state pulses, Eve blocks single photon pulses with a probability of pblock and lets other pulses pass without
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Alice BobOS
PNS attack and block 
all single photon pulses
Signal state
Uncertain state
Block all pulses
Decoy state Block  partial  single 
photon pulses
Eve
Increase the temperature Control the transmittance
Figure 5. Simple diagram of our modified PNS attack strategy. OS: optical switch.
disturbing. And the uncertain state pulses are all blocked by Eve. Moreover, for the certain signal state pulses, Eve mounts
PNS attack and splits n− 1 photons from n-photon pulses when n ≥ 2, i.e., Eve only lets one photon pass for pulses with
multiple photons. And she blocks all single photon signal state pluses. To compensate the count rates of signal state and decoy
state pulses, Eve also replaces the quantum channel with a lower loss one. So Eve can obtain all the information about the
key. Indeed, the increase of the time interval between the signal state and decoy state pulses with temperature gives Eve the
possibility to distinguish the signal state and decoy state pulses. Besides, the decrease of the output pulse intensity and the
increase of the ratio of signal state intensity and decoy state intensity provide the convenience for Eve to mount our modified
PNS attack on the signal state pulses.
Note that no additional errors are induced in the modified PNS attack. So Eve only needs to keep the count rates of the
signal state and decoy state pulses the same with the ones without attack. Next we will theoretically show that this modified
PNS attack is feasible in long transmission distance. Let us consider the QKD systems with ”weak + vacuum” decoy state
method. Suppose the average photon number of signal state is µ and the average photon number of decoy state is ν without
attack. When the temperature increases, the average photon number of signal state (decoy state) becomes µ ′ = αµ (ν ′ = β ν),
where 1>α>β>0. According to Ref. [25], the count rate of signal state without attack is
Qµ =
∞
∑
n=0
e−µ µn
n!
Yn = Y0+ 1− e
−ηµ, (11)
where Yn = 1− (1−η)
n +Y0 is the yield of an n-photon state pulse, η is the overall transmittance without attack and Y0 is
dark count rate. Similar, the count rate of decoy state without attack is
Qν =
∞
∑
n=0
e−ννn
n!
Yn = Y0+ 1− e
−ην . (12)
After our attack, the count rate of decoy state is
Qν ′ = pdis[
∞
∑
n=2
e−ν
′
ν ′n
n!
Y ′n +(1− pblock)ν
′e−ν
′
Y ′1+(e
−ν ′ + pblockν
′e−ν
′
)Y0]+ (1− pdis)Y0
= pdis(Y0+ 1− e
−ν ′η ′
− pblockν
′e−ν
′
η ′)+ (1− pdis)Y0,
(13)
where Y ′n = 1− (1−η
′)n +Y0 is the yield of an n-photon state pulse under attack and η
′ is the overall transmittance under
attack. The count rate of signal state after our modified PNS attack is
Qµ ′ = pdis[(1− µ
′e−µ
′
− e−µ
′
)Y ′1+(µ
′e−µ
′
+ e−µ
′
)Y0]+ (1− pdis)Y0. (14)
To keep the count rates of signal state and decoy state the same with those without attack, we have Qµ = Qµ ′ and Qν = Qν ′ .
Therefore, we can get
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η ′ =
1
1− µ ′e−µ
′
− e−µ
′ [
1
pdis
(Y0+ 1− e
−µη
− (1− pdis)Y0)− (µ
′e−µ
′
+ e−µ
′
)Y0]−Y0 (15)
pblock =
1
ν ′η ′e−ν
′ [Y0+ 1− e
−ν ′η ′
−
1
pdis
(Y0+ 1− e
−νη
− (1− pdis)Y0)], (16)
so we can calculate η ′ and pblock.
The numerical simulations use some GY S experiment parameters, including including the loss coefficient in the quantum
channel δ = 0.21 dB/km; the dark count probability Y0 = 1.7×10
−6; the average photon number of the signal state µ = 0.48;
the average number of the decoy state ν = 0.05; and η = 0.045× 10−δL/10, where L is the transmittance distance. We also
suppose that α = 0.8, β = 0.4, pdis = 0.8 and η
′ = 0.045× 10−δ
′L/10, where δ ′ is the loss coefficient of the new replaced
quantum channel and 0 ≤ δ ′ ≤ δ . So η ′ ≤ 0.045. Moreover, in practice, Eve can only block a part of signal state pulses
containing only one photon and 0<pblock<1 is also needed to be satisfied.
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Figure 6. The relationship between η (η ′) and L. The solid line shows how the overall transmittance η ′ changes with the
transmission distance L after our attack and the dash line shows the relationship between the overall transmittance η and the
transmission distance L. The line in the inset figure represents the relationship between the ratio of η ′ and η , i.e., η ′/η , and
the transmission distance L.
Fig. 6 shows the simulation result of the relationship between η (η ′) and L. To keep η ′ ≤ 0.045, we have L ≥ 48.6km.
That is to say, when the transmission distance L is longer than 48.6km, Eve can always find proper overall transmittance to
keep the count rate of signal state the same with the one without attack. So we can treat 48.6km as the secure transmission
distance in our analysis. The simulation result in the inset figure shows the range of η ′/η and 10.456<η ′/η<10.47, which
indicates that Eve is able to attack successfully by replacing the quantum channel with a lower loss one in practice. For
simplicity, we use η ′/η = 10 to estimate δ ′. Suppose the transmission distance is 100km and η ′/η = 10(δ−δ
′)L/10 = 10. So
we have δ − δ ′ = 0.1dB/km and δ ′ = 0.11dB/km which may be achievable with modern technology.
Fig. 7 gives out the relationship between pblock and L. We can find that 0.7149<pblock<0.7157 and pblock almost stays
invariable, which means that Eve can always keep the count rate of decoy state identical with that without attack by blocking a
part of single photon decoy state pulses. All the calculation results above indicate that, by exploiting the effects of temperature
increase in the semiconductor lasers, Eve can mount a modified PNS attack successfully.
5 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we study the effects of temperature increase on several key characteristics of gain-switched semiconductor lasers
by performing numerical simulation on the single mode temperature dependent rate equation. The results show that temper-
ature increase helps Eve in practical QKD systems. First, the recovery time of carrier density increases with temperature,
which makes the maximal repetition rate of semiconductor lasers decrease. Second, the intensity of the output photon pulse
decreases as the temperature rises. That is to say, Eve can break the security assumption of stable intensities by strong light
illumination or microwave radiation. Third, the interval between the peaks of signal state and decoy state pulses increases
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Figure 7. Simulation results of the relationship between pblock and the transmission distance L.
with temperature. And Eve may distinguish signal state and decoy state pulses by raising the temperature of semiconductor
lasers with proper tricks. We also propose a modified PNS attack by exploiting the effects of temperature increase in the
semiconductor laser. The simulation results show that Eve can always keep the count rates of signal and decoy state the same
with the ones without attack. Therefore, she can steal information about the key and stay hidden.
To defend such temperature dependent attacks on the semiconductor lasers, real-time monitoring on the characteristics of
the output light may be helpful to detect the temperature variation in the laser. However, it is not rigorous to calculate the
final key with the monitoring results on only one dimension, because temperature increase enlarges side channels in multiple
dimensions, such as wavelength, time, intensity and intensity fluctuation. Besides, real-time monitoring on the intensity of
the incoming light, installing isolator and band-pass filter may also help to detect or prevent Eve’s strong light illumination.
However, some researches showed that band-pass filter can be damaged by strong light37,38. Moreover, these methods can
not defeat microwave radiation from other directions in free space and other unknown tricks to increase the temperature of
the semiconductor laser. So legitimate users should better monitor the temperature of the laser diodes in real time. Once the
temperature increases above the threshold values, QKD systems should alarm and abort the key.
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